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LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. TRIAL COURT PREJUDICED SPENCERS WHEN IT MISCONSTRUED
OR OVERLOOKED MATERIAL FACTS IN THE RECORD
Denying a litigant access to Utah courts to have federal claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 heard is inconsistent
with the Constitution of Utah, [Article I Sections 1 and 11],
which gives its citizens the 'inherent and inalienable' right to
petition a state tribunal for redress of grievances in civil
actions.1
Furthermore, dismissing with prejudice premature or non-convenient
federal civil rights claims with prejudice is
contrary to the intent of the federal statute as well as the
federal and state constitutions. . .[and] is beyond [the trial
court's] discretionary powers and prejudiced the rights of the
[Spencers]. 2
The trial court's labeling of Spencers' claims as premature or not based on
fact or law, and then dismissing them with prejudice was erroneous and
must be reversed.
A. The Spencers' Recorded Right-of-Way, Original Variances
And Monies Paid Are Federally Protected Property Interests
A federally protected property right arises when an independent
source, such as state law, creates a legitimate claim of entitlement.3 A
federally protected property right exists when a municipality is required by
state or federal law to treat the property interest in a certain manner.
1

Kish v. Wright. 562 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1977).
id. at 629.
3
Board of Regents v. Roth, 405 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
2

1

Spencers assert that their recorded right-of-way, the original variances,
and the $1,260 paid for the City's attorney fees are federally protected
rights.
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and Parties
a. Spencers' Original Variances
On July 11, 1983, the City granted a variance to the Spencers and
their successor-in-interest that allowed the right to build on the West
parcel. This variance allowed a home to be built fronting Spencers' nonexclusive right-of-way instead of a public street. (Record at 267; Spencers'
Brief at 6.) On February 8, 1993, without notice and hearing, five months
after the City recorded the Cherrywood Phase III plat over the right-of-way,
Spencers' variance for the West parcel was revoked by the City's Mayor.
Because of the residential development around the property, without the
variance, there could be no development of Spencers' property. (Record at
273; Spencer's Brief at 8.)
On March 31, 1986, a similar variance was granted to the Spencers
for the East parcel that allowed building a home fronting the right-of-way
instead of a public street. (Record at 276-77; Spencers' Brief at 6) On May
19, 1995, without notice or hearing, Spencers were sent written notice by
counsel for the City that their original variance would not be honored by the
City. In addition, Spencers were notified that there was no mechanism by
which the City could consider allowing the variance to stand. (Record at
2

281, 304.) Again, because of the residential development around the
property, without the variance, there could be no development of this
property.
State law prohibited the City from making these

unilateral

determinations. First, the original variances themselves contained no time
constraint or restriction as to when a building permit had to be issued.
Second, the City had no statutory authority to revoke a variance without
notice or hearing. Third, prior to any revocation of the variances, the Utah
Legislature amended the legislation governing Board of Adjustments,
adding a provision providing that "[v]ariances run with the land."4 Fourth,
the Utah Constitution prohibits the City from taking action that violates
state statutory provisions.5
b. Non-Exclusive Riqht-of-Wav or Easement
On May 10, 1983, the Spencers obtained and recorded, a nonexclusive right of way across the land immediately south of their property
that joined the undeveloped City right-of-way above public road 0021.
(Record at 266; Spencers' Brief at 6.) On August 25, 1992, the
"Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4). Similar language was included with the
provisions governing variances granted on a county level. See Utah Code
Ann. §10-17-707(4).
5
Utah Const., Article XI § 5; see also Price Development Company v.
Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ffl[ 25-26; Alqood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 531-32
(Utah 1976); Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 713 n. 10 (Ut.
Ct. App.), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1998); State v. Hansen. 21
Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968); Nance v. Mayflower Tavern. Inc., 106
Utah 517,150 P.2d 773 (1944).
3

Cherrywood Manor Phase 3 was approved by the City Council and
thereafter recorded by the City on September 18, 1992. (Record at 474.)
The plat for Phase III overlaid Spencers' right-of-way. (Record at 272,
279.) The City denied Spencers access to the procedures required for
property development at least five times over a three year period on the
grounds that Spencers were obligated to resolve this City caused problem.
(See Opening Brief at 9.)
Having already recognized the validity of the right-of-way in previous
decisions by a decision of its Board of Adjustment, the City's change of
position, without notice or hearing, and requiring the Spencers to resolve
the burden of the City's error before they could begin the process
necessary for City approval, made the Spencers recipients of "unfair landuse procedures" of the City.6 The only way Spencers could resolve the
City's error would be to sue the Homeowner Association of Cherrywood to
quiet title in their prior-in-time, recorded right of way. If "[a] property owner
is of course not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair
procedures in order to obtain this [final] determination,"7 a fortiori Spencers
are not required to bear the burden of piecemeal litigation before being
allowed to be heard by the City so a final decision can be rendered on the
merits of Spencers' plans for development.
6

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001).
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County. 477 U.S. 340, 350 n. 7
(1986).

7

4

c. Payment of City's Attorney to Review Spencers' Submissions
In light of the City's previous recognition of the Spencers' right-ofway and issuance of two variances necessary for development, as well
conflict-of-interest rules governing attorneys and public policy in that
regard, (Record at 258-259), requiring Spencers to pay $1,260 for the
City's attorney to review Spencers' submissions after the City revoked the
granted variances similarly constituted another form of "unfair land-use
procedures" by the City, all of which damaged Spencers, and unjustly
enriched the City. The City cannot force the Spencers "to bear public
burdens, [that began by reason of the City's malfeasance,] which in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."8
2. Materiality of Failure to Recognize Federal Property Rights
The trial court recognized the Spencers insistence that their claims
that the variances were protected by state law, but ignored the significance
that such a finding would have on Spencers' claims.
The plaintiffs also allege that this Court failed to
address, in its first decision, the impact of the statutory
protections, applicable to the variances, issued to the plaintiff.
The plaintiffs refer to this as a "core issue." (See plaintiffs
memorandum, page 8.) The applicability of those variances
was mooted by the City's issuance of the permits. (Again, see
this Court's previous decision page 1.) This Court also ruled
that there was no factual or legal basis to support plaintiffs'
constitutional claims and thus there were no constitutional
"Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
5

claims to be addressed that arose from the variance issues.
Finally, Article XI, Section 5 is not self-executing and provides
no remedy for alleged statutory violation. These issues do not
need to be addressed again.
(Record at 601.) Because the trial court failed to recognize that Spencers'
entitlement to constitutional protections and damages against the City rose
from state and federal law that constrained the conduct of the City, the
erroneous assumption that the City had issued the permits was allowed to
"moot" the entire case and eliminated, with prejudice, Spencers right to
damages.
B. The City Issued No Building Permits
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and Parties
After Spencers filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking
a ruling that their property interests were protected by the federal
constitution, the City filed its tender of building permits and cross-motion
for summary judgment based on mootness and other arguments. In
Spencers' memorandum in opposition, they specifically pointed out that
[ejfforts of the Spencers to obtain the building permits as
represented by counsel have not been successful. (Spencer
Affidavit at fl 6 [q]).. The Notice, Tender of Performance, and
Suggestion of Mootness is not applicable because the
Spencers have not yet received the two building permits
indicated in the City's filings.
(Record at 237, 241.) Thereafter, in Spencers' motion to revise the court's
earlier granting of summary judgment in favor of the City, Spencers drew
attention again to the fact of non-issuance of the building permits. (Record
6

at 517.) At no time did the City claim that the building permits had not
been issued.
Nonetheless, the trial court was confused about the issuance of the
permits and its impact on Spencers' claims.

In its first memorandum

decision of October 2, 2000, the Court found that
[t]he first issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' request for
the issuance of two building permits. Since the Defendant has
agreed to issue the requested building permits, that issue is
now moot.
(Record at 503.) Thereafter, in the trial court's decision of September 28,
2001, Judge West interpreted his prior opinion and wrote his new opinion
as if the building permits had been granted.
In its earlier opinion, this Court also stated that with the
issuance of the building permits, the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims were now premature. . . .Finally, the plaintiffs sought
among other remedies, equitable relief. They wanted the
Court to order the defendant to issue the building permits.
They claimed that the defendant was denying them due
process of law and equal protection by refusing to issue those
permits. Once those permits were issued, those claims
became moot.
(Record at 596 (emphasis added.))
On appeal, the Spencers again challenged the trial court's
conclusion that the permits were issued—the City's tender was conditional,
the Spencers had not received the building permits, and it was not
"absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably
be expected to occur." (Opening Brief at 22-23 (citation omitted.)) The City

7

rejoined that the tender is "contained within the trial court records and is
binding upon the City." (City's Brief at 4-5). Neither Spencers nor the City
have claimed on appeal that the building permits have been issued.
2. Materiality of the Error Regarding Issuance of Permits
The trial court's misunderstanding that the building permits had been
issued appears to have been an integral part of its ruling that Spencers'
constitutional claims were moot, premature and without factual or legal
basis.

Based on the record, it was error to make such a finding. In

addition, without the issuance of building permits, the City failed to present
evidence in support of its "'heavy burden of persuading the court that the
challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.'"9
C. Spencers Asserted Constitutional Rights in A Timely Fashion
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and the Parties
In the trial court, the City argued that United States Supreme Court
"ripeness" precedent in Williamson County10 as interpreted by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Bateman11 indicated that the federal takings,
due process and equal protection were not "ripe" for review because
Spencers had not already sought compensation in state court for damages

9

Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOO. Inc.,
528 U.S. 167,189(2000).
10
See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City. 473 U.S. 172, (1985), ("Williamson County").
11
See Bateman v. City of West Bountiful. 89 F.3d 704 (10** Cir. 1996)
("Bateman.")
8

under Article I § 22. Spencers argued that "nothing in the specific statutory
provisions of U.C.A. § 10-9-708 indicates that the provisions were
designed to preclude district court review of federal or state statutory,
constitutional claims, or claims for equitable relief." (Record at 242.) The
preservation of Spencers' claims against the City was reviewed, reciting
the original filing of a complaint on May 2, 1996, and thereafter the present
litigation on August 16, 1998. (Record at 224-245.) Case law relied on by
the City to justify a claim of laches was distinguished. (Record at 246-247)
Apparently, the trial court relied on the City's Williamson County Bateman argument to dispose of the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
Initially, the trial court ruled as follows:
The second issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' claim that
their constitutional rights have been violated. The Court
agrees with the Defendant and finds that the statute of
limitations and laches' are applicable and these causes of
action are barred. See Section 10-9-1001 and Section 78-1225(3) Utah Code Annotated. In particular, the Plaintiffs' had
thirty days, after any adverse decision, to appeal the adverse
decision and they failed to do so. In addition, the Court finds
that the constitutional claims are premature and have no
factual or legal basis to support them.
(Record at 503-504.)
In Spencers' motion to revise the court's first ruling, the limiting
nature of the opinion as to when constitutional claims could be brought
was emphasized. (Record at 517-520.)

A thirty-day statute of limitation

was argued against on grounds that it (1) violated the provisions of Article I

9

§ 11, (2) conflicted with other statutes, (3) on-going wrongs created new
injury each day, and (4) federal case law had already determined that
federal civil rights claims could be brought in four years. (Record at 517520). Spencers also argued that Williamson County - Bateman position
was contrary to the practice of the Utah Supreme Court, the City's action
was final because no further action was required under state law, and
when there has been a "tortuous and protracted history of attempts to
develop the property," relief could be granted without state court
exhaustion. (Record at 549-550).

The City relied on its previous

arguments and the Court's original ruling. (Record at 535-549.)
In its second opinion, the trial court adopted the reasoning of the
City and held that where the City of Pleasant View made decisions that
were not timely appealed by the Spencers under U.C.A. § 10-9-1001, the
statute barred the "applicable claims that were not of a constitutional
nature." (Record at 600.)
While the City has conceded on appeal that the Spencers claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are timely insofar as they arose during the four
years before the filing of the present complaint (City's Brief at 18-19), the
City has renewed the argument on appeal that they are not ripe for review
under Williamson County - Bateman and remain subject to a claim of
laches. (City's Brief at 19-20.)

10

2. Williamson County - Bateman "Ripeness" Argument To Prohibit
Review of Federal Claims Is In Error
The City's reliance on the Williamson County - Bateman doctrine to
prohibit state court review of federal takings, due process and equal
protection claims in conjunction with a takings claim under state law is in
error for at least three reasons.
a. Binding Utah Precedent Has Considered Both Utah
and Federal Constitution Takings Claims At the Same Time
In the 1990 case of Farmer's New World Life Insurance Company v.
Bountiful City.12 the Utah Supreme Court evaluated the takings claims of
the Petitioner under both Article I § 22 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In 1997, in
Brendle v. City of Draper,13 the Utah Court of Appeals remanded for
adjudication and review simultaneous claims of a taking of property without
just compensation

in violation of the relevant federal and

state

constitutional provisions. The trial court's dismissal of all of Spencers'
federal constitutional claims on grounds of ripeness (or categorizing them
as "premature,") is incongruent with this binding precedent.
b.

Only Federal Precedent from the United States Supreme Court
Is Binding Upon Utah Courts
"Since the United States Supreme Court has supremacy on issues

of federal law, it is proper that state courts follow its lead in federal
,2
13

803P.2d1241 (Utah 1990).
937 P.2d 1044,1047 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
11

matters."

The rationale and results of United States Supreme Court

opinions are binding both on that Court and state courts. "When an opinion
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the
opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound."15 As such, the
Tenth Circuit Bateman opinion is not binding on Utah courts.
c. The Williamson-Bateman Result Conflicts With the Results
of Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court "Takings" Precedent
The result of two post-Bateman United States Supreme Court cases
that involved takings claims are in conflict with the Williamson County Bateman analysis proposed by the City.16
(i) No Exhaustion of Compensatory Taking Required for Due Process and
Egual Protection Claims
The 1999 case of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey
Del Monte Dunes17 ("Del Monte Dunes") was a developer's regulatory
takings claim that arose "not [because] the city had followed its zoning

14

Broadbent v. Board of Education, 910 P.2d 1274,1279 (Utah App. 1996)
cert, denied 917 P.2d 556 (emphasis added.)
15
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996).
16
For citation and review of other Supreme Court cases that specify each
constitutional claim will be analyzed on its own merits regardless of the
presence of another constitutional claim, see John Corporation vs. City of
Houston. 214 F.3d 573, 580-585 (11 th Cir. 2002).
17
526 U.S. 687, 722, (1999), as cited in Signature Properties International
Limited Partnership v. City of Edmond. 310 F.3d 1258,1267 (10th Cir.
2002). The Tenth Circuit assumed that the same description would apply
to a violation of substantive due process by engaging in arbitrary conduct.
Id.
12

ordinances and policies but rather it had not done so.

The United States

Supreme Court accepted the Ninth's Circuit determination that there had
been "finality" in the City's conduct sufficient to bring a takings, due
process and equal protection claim. The pre-requisite of obtaining state
court relief for a "takings" was only analyzed as it related to the "ripeness"
prong of the compensation component; no such analysis was made for the
claims of "due process" and "equal protection."19
In Del Monte Dunes, the Ninth Circuit did not require exhaustion of
state compensation procedures because, as recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, at the time of the City's final decision, there was no
procedure in the state of California by which compensation could be had
for inverse condemnation.20

The absence of "a reasonable, certain and

adequate provision for obtaining adequate compensation. . .at the time of
the taking"21 eliminated the state exhaustion requirement for the
compensation prong of a federal takings claim.
The City argues on appeal that for Spencers to establish a claim
under Article I § 22 for a "temporary taking" they must "demonstrate that
the City deprived them of all economically viable use of the property."
18

jd-at 722.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey. 920 F.2d 1496,15061507 (9th Cir. 1990); Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 U.S. at 698-99.
20
The Ninth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court holding in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987). See Del Monte Dunes, supra, 920 F.2d at 1507.
21
Williamson County, supra, 473 U.S. at 194.
19

13

(City's Brief at 25.)

While Spencers dispute that this is the current

standard of the Utah Supreme Court, (see pages 18-19, infra,) assuming
arguendo that this was the standard for a "temporary taking" of Spencers'
property at the time of the City's conduct, Utah's compensation for inverse
condemnation is not adequate because that standard is less than that
provided by the United States Constitution.
Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking may
nonetheless have occurred, depending on a complex of
factors including the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulations interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action. Penn Central, supra, at
124. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the
Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from
'forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.'22
In all events, jury damages were allowed for federal claims of taking,
denial of due process, and equal protection. The jury had been instructed
to resolve the factual claim that
whether in light of all the history and context of this case, the
city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final
development proposal was reasonably related to the City's
proffered justifications.23

22

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), relying on Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978) (citation also
omitted.) ("Penn Central")
23
Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 U.S. at 706.
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Spencers specifically brought this very language given to the jury to the
trial court's attention and sought relief under its authority.
Like Del Monte Dunes, the Spencers similarly qualify for a
factual evaluation of their efforts and the City's over-zealous
and illegal refusal to issue them a building permit in
accordance with the variance that ran with their land.
(Record at 252.) The trial court ignored this request.
(ii) Exhaustion of State Court Compensation Remedies Does Not
Limit Federal Takings Claims in State Court
In the 2001 case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.24 ("Palazzolo"),
the United States Supreme Court reviewed an appeal from the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island had dismissed a claim filed in state court for federal
and state compensation for a "takings" on the grounds that the "finality" of
the taking was not yet ripe for judicial review. There was no mention or
discussion in the State Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court
opinion

of

being

required

to

exhaust

state

remedies

regarding

compensation first.25 The case was remanded for federal takings review
under Penn Central. This result is contrary to the Williamson County Bateman requirement of exhaustion of all state remedies for compensation
prior to hearing any federal claims in state court.

24

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606, 617-618 (2001).
Compare Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island. 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000)
with Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
25
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3. Materiality of the Error
Even had the trial court recognized Spencers' federally protected
property

interests, misconstruing the applicable federal

and

state

standards governing the "ripeness" of Spencers constitutional claims
contributed to the trial court's dismissal of the claims.
D. There Was Proper Evidence of Damages in the Trial Court Record
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and the Parties
The trial court's memorandum decisions limited how and when
Spencers could claim damages from the City for its failure to previously
issue building permits. First, the trial court required damages be shown in
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.
In this instance, equitable remedies addressed the plaintiffs'
injuries. The permits were obtained. There is nothing,
submitted to the [district court], in plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, that establishes that the plaintiffs suffered
any economic damage as a result of the delay in issuing the
permits.
(Record at 598.) This overlooked the damages claims raised in the record
by the Affidavit of Dennis Spencer, and incorporated in the analysis used
in the Memorandum In Opposition to the City's summary judgment motion.
(Record at 239-240; 291-293.)

Second, the trial court sought to limit

Spencers to those damages that arose after the City's tender of the
building permits.
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Since the City of Pleasant View offered to issue the permits to
the plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that would
support a finding that the plaintiffs had been otherwise
damaged.
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develop the property. Spencers documented a loss of use of their property
by showing the City interfered with use of the right-of-way. For example,
the City recorded the Cherrywood plat over the right-of-way (Record at
279) and Chief Cragun, as a policy maker of the City, condoned Dennis
Spencer's arrest for being on the right-of-way (Record at 289-291). The
City ignored Spencers' prior-in-time, recorded right of way from May 1993
through November 1996 when Spencers could not access the City's
processes for property development. (See Opening Brief at 9.)

From

February 8, 1993 through December 20, 1999, the City would not
recognize the binding nature of the original variances and burdened
Spencers' property with extra costs and delays through inconsistent,
undefined, and changing requirements. (See Opening Brief 10-13)
Spencers also demonstrated damages necessary to prove an
"inverse condemnation" claim under Article I § 22 of the Utah Constitution
requires "(1) property, (2) a taking or damaging, and (3) a public use."26
The parties have disputed whether or not their was a "taking".
A 'taking' is 'any substantial interference with private property
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the
owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial
degree abridged or destroyed.'27

26

Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17 If 27, 42 P.3d 379.
Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d 870 at
876 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
27
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Finally, as if relates generally to damage claims, even if specific and
nencers would be entitled to

28

Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, fflf 50-51, 2002 Utah
LEXIS 220.
29 5 e e Paiazzolo, supra,
30
See Penn Central supra,
19

claim nominal damages for the City's violation of their federally protected
rights.31
2. Materiality of the Error
But for the failure of the trial court to recognize the evidence of
damages raised by Spencers in the record, the trial court could not have
dismissed Spencers claim of entitlement to damages for the City's violation
of their federal and state protected property rights.
Claiming damages was recognized as a key component of strategy
suggested by the United States Supreme Court in the Buckhannon opinion
to protect Plaintiffs from loss of fees and costs in an action under 42
U.S.C.

§

1983 when "voluntary" conduct

of formerly

recalcitrant

government defendants mooted the request for injunctive relief.
The Court discounted the petitioners' arguments that
'mischievous defendants' could avoid liability for attorney fees
in a meritorious suit by voluntarily changing their conduct,
because 'so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for
damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the
case.

31

Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 858 P.2d 1372, 1378 & n. 4
(Utah 1993) (citation omitted.) ("A Plaintiff cannot recover more than
nominal damages for procedural due process violations unless it is shown
that there would have been no deprivation had proper procedures been
followed or that if the deprivation had occurred under the procedure, the
lack of procedure caused actual harm").
32
Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 608-609 (2001)
("Buckhannon"), as cited in Loggerhead Turtle, et. al. vs. County Council of
Volusia County, Florida, 307 F.3d 1318,1326 (11 th Cir. 2002).
20
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First, Spencers could not have submitted a motion and affidavit to
receive attorney fees under Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-505
until the trial court ruled they were entitled to the same.34
Second, the Spencers letter to the trial court indicated that while the
Buckhannon opinion was "relevant, in part, but not dispositive of Spencers'
claims." (Record at 593). Spencers distinguished their situation from that
of Buckhannon because (1) they had sought damages as well as injunctive
relief, (2) cessation of a practice did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to determine the legality of the practice, unless it is absolutely
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior will occur, and (3) despite
Spencers challenge to the City's infringement on a previously granted
variance, confirmed by state law, and a duty to pay attorney fees of the
City for the City's review of Spencers' applications, no evidence was
introduced by the City to show that the prior practices of the City would not
occur again. (Record at 592-593).
Third, Plaintiffs had previously argued as part of their approach on
the "catalyst" theory that the parties had changed their legal relationship,35
the essence of the requirement of Buckhannon test cited in the Spencers'
Opening Brief. (See page 19.)

34

See N.A.R., Inc. v. Marcek, 2000 UT App 300, fflf 14-15; 13 P.3d. 612.
"Civil rights case law recognizes that when parties have changed their
legal relationship, (and these parties have),..." (Record at 544.)
35
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relationship of the parties."36
Fifth, the final "judicial imprimatur" or ruling on both the arguments
regarding tender of buildin<
available tor review or argument at the time Spencers' letter was submitted
because the trial court had not issued its second memorandum decision or
Ihc fiii.il mill'i in Hit1 i <r>t'
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judgment and the final order of dismissal incorporated bv reference the
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Subsequent to the trial court's final ruling, several federal court of appeals
h.ivo determined that this kind

"oh'ement satisfies the

requirements of Buckhannon.
A plaintiff who obtains a court order incorporating an
agreement that includes relief the plaintiff sought in the
lawsuit is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees under 42
U.S.C. S1988. 37

36

Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Services. 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001).
37
Labotest v. Bonta, 297 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
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[E]ven absent the entry of a formal consent decree, if the
district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into
its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction, it
may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties' agreement.38
By analogy, the City's conduct was tantamount to a Rule 68 offer of
judgment that was accepted by the trial court.
[Ujnlike a 'defendant's voluntary change in conduct' or a
purely private settlement resulting in a dismissal, a Rule 68
judgment represents a 'judicially sanctioned change in the
relationship between the parties.'
The City's Tenth Circuit opinion is based on facts not relevant to this
case.40
CONCLUSION
The trial court overlooked material facts and arguments Spencers
had placed in the record that established (1) their recorded right-of-way
and original variances were property rights subject to protection of the
United States Constitution, (2) the City had not issued any building permits
to Spencers, (3) Spencers asserted their constitutional rights in a timely
fashion, and (4) appropriate evidence was in the record to raise questions
of fact regarding damages suffered by Spencers by reason of the City's

38

American Disability Association, Inc. vs. Ariel Chmielarz. 289 F.3d 1315,
1320 (11 th Cir. 2002)
39
Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative,
Inc., 298 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2002).
40
Griffin v.Steeltek, inc.. 261 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2001)
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summary
judgment in favor of the City must be reversed and the case remanded.
Even if Spencers obtain no more relief than the "binding" tender of
liiiilf inn I |w<ini|i<. .Hid 'lii/'iiii imm IIK> ('.iiy, (|K> ('unit's integration and
reference to those '>.••.- ements in its decision1 in«i unHi^s m/ii*.. sp^v *i\s
a prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees and costs.
DA I bU and L X t O J I LI.) this 241" <l,.iy ol January, 2003.
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